The best option for peace is perhaps one that was offered thirty years ago when, on March 9, 1977, President Jimmy Carter said "recognized borders have to be mutual … where sovereignty is mutually agreed. While Carter is a regular guest lecturer in my classes, I last sat down with him for a substantive talk in June 2002. The two accords, titled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel," led to considerable changes in the Middle East. Here, his position is consistent with that of his successors. It contains an appendix and a series of maps, some of which he seems to have mislabeled and taken from Clinton-era negotiator Dennis Ross' The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. Numerous times during the 1980s, Carter quipped after leaving meetings with Middle Eastern or U.S. officials that, if given a chance, he could "make this happen." For Carter, history and ideology bestowed unwanted moorings and unnecessary rigidities; they shackled the pragmatism and flexibility of the would-be negotiator. Jimmy Carter's administration continued to sustain political damage. Carter was responsible for the signing of the first peace treaty between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors, Egypt. Carter adds that Hamas would modify its rejection of Israel if there were a negotiated agreement that the Palestinian people can approve, "an important facet of the Camp David Accords,"[44] but the Camp David accords never specified universal Palestinian ratification. The Carter Doctrine was a policy proclaimed by President of the United States Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980, which stated that the United States would use military force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf. amount, in any currency, is appreciated. 42. [19] While the outcome of Camp David was a far cry from the comprehensive peace Carter had sought, it was a diplomatic breakthrough. Negotiating over Jerusalem's future and the West Bank would have been more complex, if not impossible, than the discussions over Sinai. The meeting at Camp David was planned for a few days, but stretched into 13 days of very difficult negotiations. To suit his desired ends, he manipulates information, redefines facts, and exaggerates conclusions. This is not a parsing of an arbitrary phrase; it took five months to negotiate and endorse the intentional ambiguity embodied in the language of the resolution. The meetings at Camp David were held in September 1978 and were originally intended to last only a few days. [7] Author's notes on Jimmy Carter's meetings with Palestinian notables, American Consulate, east Jerusalem, Mar. He first adopted this revision of UNSCR 242 in his December 10, 2002 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech when he referred to "withdrawal from the occupied territories." Ultimately, the Nixon Doctrine's application provided military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia so that US allies could ensure peace and stability there. To protect the security of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The two nations engaged in a war of attrition from 1967 to 1970, which ended with a treaty that kept the borders as they had been at the end of the Six-Day War. Related Topics:  Arab-Israeli debate in the U.S., US policy, US politics  |  Kenneth W. Stein  |  Spring 2007 MEQ Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, had also been a surprise to much of the world. [29] Ibid. [19] Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 361; Quandt, Camp David, 254-257; Wright, Thirteen Days in September, 264. A deeply religious man who had taught Sunday school for years (and has continued to do so in retirement), Carter disregarded his advisers' warnings. 186. President Sadat was watching a military parade from a reviewing stand. Carter invented the substance of this meeting to indicate that Assad was leaning toward flexibility. He had long been active in the movement that overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, and served for many years as a secondary figure to the legendary Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. 38. Finally, he issued a presidential directive ordering the development of smaller nuclear weapons that could be used to strike highly specific targets. [16] Author interview with Yahiel Kadishai, Begin's secretary (1977-83) and confidante, July 5, 1993, Tel Aviv. Several days after our meeting, he wrote an op-ed condemning the U.S. government's alignment with Israel and Washington's unwillingness to pursue talks with Palestinian leaders. [39] In effect, Carter is changing the "Land for Peace" formula into "Land for Negotiations." That announcement marked a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy, which had been focused since the beginning of Carter’s presidency on promoting international human rights and on pursuing détente with the Soviet Union. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations on March 2, 2006, he used a similar phrase and added the false claim that Begin had agreed to Carter's reinterpretation of UNSCR 242 at Camp David in 1978. Carter realized that with Begin adamant against further concessions, he had no tangible item to offer to the Palestinians or other Arab leaders to reach a broader peace agreement. Among the most troubling aspects of Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid is Carter's apparent willingness to condone the killing of Israelis. Ultimately, the three leaders traveled to the White House, and on September 17, 1978, signed the Camp David Accords. Unfortunately for Carter, his new doctrine did not result in his reelection. by Kenneth W. Stein Timing is everything. True, this had been Begin's view prior to Israel's independence in 1948, but it was not, as Carter implied, Begin's position after his twenty-nine years in the Knesset (parliament) or during his premiership. On the one hand, he felt Israel was being intransigent; on the other, he genuinely had an attachment to the country as the ‘land of the Bible.'"[8]. [48] Jimmy Carter, Sheraton Hotel, Damascus, press conference, Mar. [3] Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 376, 379-380. "[15] Begin's personal secretary later said Begin was angry with what he had learned in the books by Brzezinski and National Security Council staff member William B. Quandt about Carter's behind-the-scenes maneuvering. My tasks as Middle East fellow included writing memoranda for Carter about Middle Eastern issues, taking notes at virtually all Carter meetings that addressed Middle Eastern issues, preparing a monthly analysis of events, coordinating major Middle East conferences, and planning Middle Eastern trips. He hoped the relative isolation might encourage Sadat and Begin to make a lasting deal. The Camp David Accords, Jimmy Carter's 1978 Middle East Peace Plan. The Carter administration was sidelined for much of this period when Egypt and Israel conducted bilateral talks but it very soon became apparent that without U.S. mediation, the two sides (if left alone) would be unable to reach any agreement. This is Carter's way of chiding the interviewer for not accepting his wisdom. President Carter, in his State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980, after stating that Soviet troops in Afghanistan posed "a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil," proclaimed: The Carter administration began to build up the Rapid Deployment Force, which would eventually become CENTCOM. The Middle East represented the high point and the low point of the administration's foreign policy. Throughout the summit, he effectively used the prospect of American aid and friendship as leverage to induce the parties to offer concessions and maintain diplomatic flexibility. When Menachem Begin returned to Israel from Camp David, he was met with considerable criticism. Carter also claims that Hamas supports a 2002 Arab summit resolution which advocates a two-state solution, albeit one dependent on the right of return of Palestinian refugees. So I was willing to break the shell more than he was.[10]. [36] The most detailed overview and analysis of UNSC Resolution 242's evolution may be found in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: The Building Block for Peacemaking (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993). The issue of the Palestinians was not resolved, and the tortured relationship between Israel and the Palestinians continues to this day. In order to convey a sense that Middle Eastern leaders or Washington officials trusted him and wanted him to continue to mediate, he would open remarks to either of them with, "I was authorized to report ....", Carter has come to scorn those who disagree with him. Carter adds that he "urged them …to forgo violence. [6] Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 222-229; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 35-60; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001(New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 448-455. On November 19, 1977, Sadat flew from Egypt to Israel. The heated and angry exchanges between the two leaders revealed to Carter that direct, face-to-face talks were actually counter-productive and from then on Carter and the U.S. team separated Begin and Sadat for the rest of the summit. The world was fascinated by images of an Arab leader being greeted at the airport by Israeli leaders. The wars between Egypt and Israel were officially over. [31] However, in legitimizing a maximalist reading of Resolution 194, Carter flirts with the de-legitimization of Israel as a Jewish state. resolutions.". However unpopular such a policy would have been, Carter would have not caved in either to Israeli leaders or U.S. supporters of Israel. No area of the world had a greater impact on American politics, national security, and economic well-being than did the Middle East in 1979. policy."[11]. Carter Doctrine, foreign policy initiative of the United States, introduced by U.S. President Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address, that returned the country to its traditional strategy of containment of the Soviet Union. [16] On our 1987 trip to Israel, Begin refused to see Carter, citing health reasons, but Begin's personal secretary told me it was because of the way Carter had treated Begin. After his State of the Union address, Carter outlined specific measures that he would take to implement his new doctrine. This plays into the notion in Arab societies that the cause of their problems lies with Western powers and other outsiders. Carter is also correct that if there is to be any long-term solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there should be a two-state solution in which both Israel as a Jewish state and a Palestinian Arab state are independent on contiguous land and free from external intrusion. The Soviet Union needed to keep negotiating in good faith. At various times people became frustrated and threatened to leave. Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid will feed that belief. [19] But other issues—high inflation and mortgage rates, the Iran hostage crisis, a national sense of malaise, and the third party candidature of John Anderson—may have contributed more to Carter's loss. [13], With the talks about to break down, Carter suddenly changed the United States’ role so that instead of merely facilitating negotiations, the American delegation would now lead them. What did Carter believe was necessary to reach an agreement? Then-national security advisor Brzezinski explained that Washington would "apply maximum leverage on Israel to accommodate,"[14] by keeping the West Bank's political future on the table for future negotiations.